Episode Transcript
[00:00:00] Speaker A: Global south countries beware. After Trump's performance at the un, it is normalized for a US imperial president to openly threaten ancient civilizations and tens of millions of civilians with annihilation. No wonder Putin and Xi Jinping skipped the UN General assembly, given they had only recently met New Order leaders in Delhi. For India, its External Affairs Minister Jaishankar made the case for Security Council reform. But while the genocide in Gaza continues and the US wages war on Russia through Ukraine as well as Iran, are the UN's days numbered? I'm Afshun Ratansi and your watching New Order.
At least Antonio Guterres is gone as US Secretary General, his inaction over the Gaza genocide and wars in Europe and West Asia may go down in history. Even after he's given up his grace and favor mansion in Manhattan, he was accused of covering up harassment, censoring free speech and allegedly disparaging the UN Palestine Rapporteur in private while he publicly distanced his office from her calls for action. 65 years after the CIA linked death of Guterres predecessor Dag Hammarshol, the USA and Britain will not open the files on how that Secretary General met an untimely death. Unlike Hammarshol, Guterres sought to look the other way when it came to injustice. And then he had the nerve to call for the kind of UN reform asked for by the Indian government as he was retiring. What was he doing then for 10 years? For the Global south though, the issue has been what it has been since the dawn of US hate hegemonic power. How best to mitigate lethal policies emanating from Washington as hundreds of millions are pushed into poverty by inflation triggered by the NATO war on Russia through Ukraine or devastation in West Asia? New Order Zahan will be on later to answer your questions posted on social media. With me now though, is one of the world's most important international relations scholars, the University of Chicago's Professor John Mersheimer. Professor John Mersheimer, welcome to New Order. So Russia and China, let alone India, have repeatedly called for India to be on the UN Security Council. How weakened do you think the UN has been because of the NATO war on Russia through Ukraine and the war on Iran?
[00:02:16] Speaker B: Well, I think that the un, and here we're talking about the UN Security Council as well, has never had much influence on important events in international politics. And the possible reason is never.
Can you name an example of where the UN really mattered in international policy?
[00:02:36] Speaker A: Well, that's a. I can't. When it issues a Security Council Resolution like, I don't know, the one Russia abstained on over Libya, giving the green light, as it were.
[00:02:46] Speaker B: Sure, but that was not a major event. And it was one that the Russians didn't care that much about at the time, and the United States did. Anytime there's a conflict between the great powers, the great powers have different interests, different views on what should be done. The Security Council is paralyzed because the great powers all have a veto. The UN was set up so that nothing would ever be done that was not in the interests of the great powers. And that means anytime one great power misbehaves, the other great powers can't use the UN to punish that great power. That's misbehaving. So therefore, the UN has never had any teeth when great powers are at odds with each other.
[00:03:33] Speaker A: So you're on John Bolton's side. The UN building in Manhattan should be leveled.
[00:03:38] Speaker B: No, that's much too extreme. The UN serves a useful purpose. It sometimes is very effective for dealing with minor issues. And furthermore, it is a place where the great powers and other powers can go and talk and engage in diplomatic activity. That does matter somewhat in international politics. But if you're looking for an international institution that's going to be able to coerce or punish a great power, the United nations is never going to be able to do that. No great power would ever allow an institution to have that kind of coercive leverage over itself.
And that means that institutions, international institutions, are never going to be very powerful when they are doing things that are designed to curtail a great power.
[00:04:34] Speaker A: So what do you think of Jaishankar saying that India should be on the UN Security Council and Russia and China saying India should be on it? Does it really matter at all who's on the UN Security Council?
[00:04:47] Speaker B: Well, it matters somewhat. But the key point you want to remember here is that the UN Security Council was established at the end of World War II.
The Japanese and the Germans who had just been defeated were not on the UN Security Council. And Britain and France were on the UN Security Council today. I think most people would argue that you'd better be better off with Germany and Japan, which are more powerful than France and Britain on the Security Council. With regard to India, it didn't even have its independence in 1945, given that it got its independence in 1947. Of course, if you were putting together the UN Security Council today, you'd put India on it. You'd put a handful of other countries, including Japan and Germany, on it as well.
But the problem is that the politics of rejiggering the UN Security Council to change its membership would be fierce and it would be almost impossible to get certain countries on today that really do deserve to be on. I think the Chinese, for example, would have all sorts of problems with India when push came to shove. They may say India should be on it now, but I have my doubts about that. The Russians would not want the Germans on the Security Council, and the Chinese would certainly not want the Japanese on the Security Council. And then there's the whole question of, how about Brazil? Don't we need a member from Latin America? How about South Africa or Nigeria? Don't we need a member from Africa? And so forth and so on. But I think the politics rule out putting any of those countries on the Security Council anytime soon. And then I would also add, and this is not an unimportant point, the more countries that you add who have a veto, and remember, when you put a country on the Security Council, you make it a permanent member of the Security Council, it has a veto. The more countries that are on that Security Council with a veto, the less effective that Security Council will be, which
[00:07:03] Speaker A: of course, is an organizational problem or conceptual problem that BRICS are having to evaluate. And you know, it was surprising as regarded by some that the New Delhi Declaration of the BRICS summit, they did sign it. Everyone signed it. Some people had their doubts. But there wasn't one mention of the United States or Israel in the 140 paragraph New Delhi Declaration, a sign that BRICS fears, BRICS fears Israel, the Israel lobby and the United States.
[00:07:42] Speaker B: Well, it's very important to emphasize that no country on the planet wants to antagonize the United States unless they absolutely have to, because they don't want a vengeful President Trump to put his gun sights on them.
So it's hardly surprising to me that the various BRICS countries, and this is especially true of the Indians, have little interest in causing trouble with the United States. And with regard to causing trouble with Israel, I think every actor in the international system understands that if you pick on India, you are, excuse me, you pick on Israel, you are, in effect, picking on the United States because the United States and Israel are joined at the hip. And anything anybody does to criticize Israel will be taken as a slight by President Trump and President Trump. Trump will go after that country or after that international institution, if it's, for example, the International Criminal Court, poor little
[00:08:45] Speaker A: Britain over the settlements they're sanctioning then. But having said that, India, in a sense, is Antagonizing the United States by refusing the orders from Washington to stop importing Russian oil, which is now at record numbers. The more the United States wants to stop it, let alone the NATO, Western European countries, the more India imports of Russian energy. No one cares.
[00:09:14] Speaker B: Well, India's walking a fine line here. And India, on one hand, has a deep seated interest in having good strategic relations and good economic relations with the United States.
And in fact, when President Trump came back to the White House last January, this is January of 2025, and Prime Minister Modi visited him in Washington, early on, it looked like those relations between the United States and India, which had been good for the previous two administrations, would be good moving forward. But in the summer of 2025, President Trump turned against the Indians, slapped very high tariffs on them, and really poisoned relations between the United States and the Indians. And this was clearly not to India's advantage, and India did not know what to do. But since then, relations have improved, and the Indians are going to great lengths not to antagonize the United States at the same time. India, as you well know, is firmly embedded in brics and in the sco, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. And both of these institutions are very important for India, but they have a subtle anti American BIA built into them. So the Indians, when they operate inside those two institutions, have to be very careful that they don't do anything to antagonize the United States. And this, of course, is why you would not expect brics to issue a declaration that was at all critical of the United States, or Israel, for that matter.
[00:10:54] Speaker A: Yeah, I wasn't sure why you recently said India would have to remain closer to the United States. Because India China trade now beats India US Trade.
And India, like China, is completely fearless when it comes to the threat of sanctions or the threat of tariffs. There's no way that Trump could have threatened Xi Jinping at the White House, given Chinese monopoly power over rare earths, for instance.
[00:11:28] Speaker B: But look, the thing you want to remember about India's position vis a vis China is that there's no question that economically India has a deep seated interest in continuing to trade with China. It's a very important economic partner. But if you talk to any Indian in the national security community of that country, they will tell you that the principal threat that India faces is China. It's a threat. From their perspective in the Himalaya Mountains, it's a threat because it supports Pakistan, which of course, is a mortal rival of India. And very importantly, China is seen as a threat to India, because it's building a blue water navy that's going to go through the Indian Ocean. And when you look at all the economic might that China has, which will translate into military might, and you look at the disadvantage that India is at when it comes to wealth and therefore military power, the Indians are very nervous, if not scared of China, and they look to the United States States to provide assistance. They want the United States to help India contain power.
[00:12:37] Speaker A: How convenient is that? How convenient is that for existing power structures against the new order to enforce that divide and rule, as it were, so that elite classes in India believe that China is the biggest threat?
[00:12:54] Speaker B: Well, China is the biggest threat. There's just no question about it. All you have to do is look at the distribution of power in the world. China is a peer competitor to the United States. There's great fear in the United States that China will eventually become the most, the most powerful state on the planet. And if you're India and you live right next door to China and you have a territorial dispute in the Himalaya Mountains, you don't want them going through the Indian Ocean. And you worry about Pakistan and you realize that Pakistan is closely allied with China. Of course, if you're India, you're going to worry about China.
[00:13:31] Speaker A: Professor John Mearsheimer will continue after the break. Keep watching New Order.
You're watching New Order. Professor Mearsheimer, you were talking about how China is perceived and according to you, actually a threat to India. But in this world of multipolarity, wasn't the handshake between Narendra Modi and Xi Jinping incredibly important in terms of multipolar systems that are supposed to be emerging? And I hinted at it by saying it suits NATO nations to continually harp on about the Himalayan conflict. But actually, once China and India get over that, that will be the crucial change in power relations as regards brics emergence.
[00:14:29] Speaker B: Well, as you remember, well, there was a war in 1962 between China and India over that territory up in the Himalayas.
And 1962 was a long time ago, and the two sides are still at loggerheads as to where to draw the boundary.
And the Indians understand that the Chinese are tough customers, and the Chinese think that the Indians are tough customers. And it's hard to figure out how to settle this one.
If it was easy to settle this conflict between those two powers, they'd do it.
[00:15:04] Speaker A: But would they do it? Would they do it given the competing pressures on elite classes, say, within India that may be educated in the United States and in NATO countries who perceive this as being incredibly important when the masses of people in India and the masses of people obviously in China don't feel it is of paramount importance.
[00:15:31] Speaker B: Well, I think that the Indian elites, whether they're educated in the United States or not, do not need the west to tell them how to think about what their interests are. I think the Indian elites are fully capable of figuring out what's in their national interest. And they believe, and I believe the vast majority of people in India believe, that the borders up in the Himalayas should reflect India's interests. Whenever you talk about territory in the modern world, you're invariably talking about sacred territory. Nationalism, which is the most powerful political ideology on the planet, places great emphasis on territorial boundaries. And the fact is that most Indians feel that the boundaries should be drawn in a place that reflects what India thinks of the problem boundaries.
And the same thing is true on the Chinese side. The Chinese believe that what we're fighting for, what we Chinese are fighting for up in the Himalayas is sacred territory. And anytime you have two sides that are deeply committed to drawing a boundary and they can't agree on where that boundary should be, the potential for trouble is there. And that's what we're talking about here. We're talking about the potential. The last time there was a war between China and India was in 1970.
And there's no reason to think a war is going to break out anytime soon. And I think the Indians and the Chinese want to avoid a war for sure, and let's hope that they do. But I do think it's important to understand that from India's point of view, as they watch the Chinese building up their military forces up in the Himalayas, they have good cause to be concerned.
[00:17:15] Speaker A: Yeah, I mean, I'm not sure China's going to invade anytime soon, but onto that BRICS summit in Delhi, there was one notable absence.
I mean, Iran was represented, the UAE was represented, but Saudi Arabia didn't send MBS to Delhi.
What do you think about that? And I suppose that is in relation to current problems. Saudi Arabia is suffering after its bombing of Sanaya Bolt.
[00:17:44] Speaker B: As you know, Saudi Arabia is in really deep trouble.
They were remarkably foolish, the Saudis, to attack the Houthis and pick a fight with them. And now you have what is almost a full blown war taking place between the Houthis and the Saudis. And the Houthis are a formidable fighting force and the Saudis are not. And it's hard to understand why the Saudis were, would pick a fight with the Houthis. Who are causing them all sorts of trouble.
[00:18:24] Speaker A: Why do you think they did? Because it can't be, I don't know, CIA intel people telling the Saudi government to do that because Trump refused help.
Clearly, when MBS called, Apparently what's very
[00:18:39] Speaker B: important to understand that the reports in the United States are that President Trump is encouraged the Saudis to attack the Houthi airport, the Sana' A airport. That Trump, it was in favor of that.
And then once the war began to heat up and the Saudis were in deep trouble because the Houthis are such a formidable fighting force, on September 10th, MBS twice called Trump and asked Trump to send the American cavalry in to rescue him, and Trump refused.
Then on Thursday, September 17, MBS called him again and it looked like Trump was then going to intervene on behalf of the Saudis against the Houthis. This was on the 17th, but by the 20th, Trump had decided to think better of it. It looked like he was on the verge of attacking the Houthis. But then on the 20th, he said, I'm not going to do this. So that was the third time MBS asked for help, and it was the third time Trump, Trump turned him down. Now, you ask why was this the case? You want to remember that when President Trump came into the White House in January 2025, shortly thereafter, two months later, in March of 2025, he said that he was going to go to war against the Houthis and defeat the Houthis. Well, two months later, in May 2025, he quit. He declared victory, but in fact, the Houthis beat the United States. We did not defeat the Houthis. President Trump is fully aware that the Houthi remarkably formidable fighting force. And the last thing he wants to do is get into a fight with them to try to rescue Saudi Arabia. He wants the Saudis to fight the Houthis by themselves.
[00:20:29] Speaker A: Well, we don't have time to talk about my great prime minister, the unelected Andy Burnham, who has somehow offered British help in the fights in Yemen.
I understand, though, that you've been in Russia recently.
I mean, all these topics affect the global south because of the price of energy. Yemen, obviously the Babel Mandeb, Iran and the Gulf, obviously the Strait of Hormuz.
The war in Europe clearly also has an impact on the global south.
What impression did you get from Russian officials about how Russia sees the new order?
[00:21:07] Speaker B: Well, I think the Russians are focused laser like, as you would expect, on the war in Ukraine. And Putin has been under a lot of pressure for the past few years because most people in the Russian elite think he has not waged this war vigorously enough.
And what's happened is that since June, the Russians have really ramped up their bombing campaign against Ukraine. And I found that most people I talk to inside the Russian elite believe the Russians are now on their way to.
[00:21:41] Speaker A: I should just say, sorry to interrupt, but Western European propaganda media arguably all said that the recent Duma elections in Russia, the anti war parties weren't allowed and some of them were actually linked to a USAID and the national end for democracy. But anyway, the Russian people somehow, I mean, was your impression, and would your impression be that the Russian people actually are against Putin, as it were, because he's not carrying out the war in Ukraine in a fashion that's extreme enough? Not that Putin should allow Kiev to win.
[00:22:21] Speaker B: I'm sure there's some people who just want to end the war, period.
But I think that most of the dissatisfaction in Russia, this is certainly true at elite levels, had to do with the fact that Putin was not waging the war vigorously enough. There was a great deal of anger in the Russian elite directed at Putin for not getting really tough with the Ukrainians. And my sense is from talking to people, but again, I didn't survey public opinion. My sense from talking to people is that down below inside the body politic, that that sentiment was shared by most people. They thought that the war had gone on too long, it was time to settle it. And I think that that's what Putin is trying to do now.
He has greatly expanded the air campaign and the Russians are pushing forward on the ground.
And I would note here, by the way, that most of the Russians I talk to think that this expanded ground war will facilitate more rapid advances on the battlefield.
[00:23:27] Speaker A: And you believe that in some ways not using, as you put it, pursuing it more vigorously. Perhaps the tempering is also partly to do with Russia's alliances within brics and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization decision.
[00:23:43] Speaker B: It's very hard to say. I'm sure that there is pressure from inside brics, inside the sco, not to expand the war too much, certainly not to attack into Europe or to use nuclear weapons. But I also think that people in brics, other countries in brics and the sco, would like the Russians to negotiate an end to this war. I think they want to see the war over with.
Of course, the Russians would like to end the war as well, but negotiations don't hold out any promise. So the Russians believe that there's only one way to end this war and that's to do it militarily. And again, that's why they are ramping up the military pressure on the Ukrainians because they think that this is the only way they can settle the conflict.
[00:24:31] Speaker A: Professor Joan Mearschammer, thank you.
[00:24:34] Speaker B: You're welcome.
[00:24:42] Speaker A: Time for social media now through Zara.
[00:24:45] Speaker C: See, the next step for you is going to have to be dyeing your hair green because we're already matching clothes. We have to match hair now.
[00:24:50] Speaker A: That's true blue.
[00:24:51] Speaker C: Getting to our questions, Iqbalam has asked, is Ukraine just Israel 2.0? It takes weapons and intelligence from Washington and it takes orders from Tel Aviv.
[00:25:00] Speaker A: Iqbalam, I didn't realize we're going out in Mexico as well. Zelensky said, quote, we will definitely become a big Israel. So he has a point. Iqbal, is Ukraine just Israel 2.0? Because Zelenskyy actually said it. The US subsidy to Israel $318 billion, 86% of its military to Ukraine 182 billion in much shorter time. So all the money laundering, the recycling of money through the military industrial complex, it certainly looks like it. Zelenskyy genocided the Donbas, blew up churches. Who does that remind you of? And Obama's ambassador to Israel, Daniel Shapiro, outlined it all in the Atlantic Council in a blueprint for Ukraine being the Israel in the center of Europe. As a point.
[00:25:44] Speaker C: Keeping up with a similar theme, Drew Peacock has asked, are the Israelis behind this madness, trying to torch the world's economies deliberately?
[00:25:51] Speaker A: I'm not sure whether it's deliberately. It certainly looks like it. But then again, if you think about it like we were talking about with Professor John Mearsheimer in the multipolar world, if NATO countries are destroying themselves, they're also every country has a turn towards brics countries. And anti Israel hatred is growing in NATO countries.
China is the largest source of Israel's imports. Israel exports to China up 22%. And of course we know Israel selling weapons to India $20 billion between 2020 and 2024 since January 26, 8.6 billion. Israel is looking to the new world as it tortures is maybe not all the world's economies, just the old world before the new order.
[00:26:36] Speaker C: And finally, Grove has asked India used to be Britain's vassal, why not become America's vassal now?
[00:26:41] Speaker A: Well, India isn't anyone's vassal. Arguably China is now India's biggest trade partner. As I was talking to Professor Mearsheimer about, that's beaten the United States. Russia supplies half of India's oil even though the United States is threatening it. And India chairs bricks. Got 11 governments here. Text that never mentions the United States, which I started that Mearsheimer interview with. If India wanted to be America's vassal, the United States vassal, it might have said so. It doesn't need to be anyone's vassal.
[00:27:10] Speaker C: Thanks, Afshin, for those answers. That's all I have for this week. See you next Sunday.
[00:27:14] Speaker A: See you next Sunday, Zahra. And remember to follow us on xewaudertv to ask your questions. We'll be back with another look at the people, countries and ideas shaping what comes next for India and its partners. See you Sunday.
