Episode Transcript
[00:00:00] Speaker A: No ordinary UN General assembly going on right now in New York after the increasingly absurd looking organization failed to prevent genocide in Gaza. The UN continues its impotence when it comes to wars in Europe and on Iran. How is it possible that India is not on the UN Security Council when a US vassal like Britain can veto resolutions amidst billions feeling the price pain from the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el Mandeb. I'm Afshin Ratansi. Welcome to New Order.
Foreign There'll be no Putin at the UN General assembly, but his friends Xi Jinping and Modi will be in the usa. Xi Jinping said to be Trump on Thursday and he does so when for the first time in around 150 years, China has a bigger economy than the USA by PPP. Did Trump see Modi hold hands with Iran's President Pescheskin at the BRICS meeting in Delhi? Will Trump tell him off? Or is India like China, just too powerful now to order around? And what role does a diminished Western Europe have to play now? It has been all but bankrupted by its financial backing for corrupt Kiev. We're still in a world where a USA whose elite are mired in Epstein carnage can openly assassinate or kidnap world leaders at will. But who has the courage to do anything about it? From New Delhi to New York, the question is no longer now who has the most power, but who gets to shape what comes next?
New Order Zahra Khan will be on later to answer your questions posted on social media. First on New Order, I am joined from Washington D.C. by Professor Anatol Levin, Director of the Eurasia Program at the Quincy Institute. Professor Anatol Levin, welcome to New Order.
So people talking about the UN General Assembly, I mean, do you think it has been weakened in some ways given that we had the Delhi BRICS summit? And I think you've said that any US China conflict would lead to the end of the un.
[00:01:59] Speaker B: Yes, I mean the decline of the UN has been one of the saddest spectacles I think, over the past generation. And that has really very much been the work of Washington, both above all under Republican, but also under Democratic administrations which really have set out to cripple and sideline the UN because of course the UN is one place that the US cannot fully control. It can veto.
But repeatedly on the subject of Israel, most notably, you have had huge majorities in the General assembly voting against the U.S. the U.S. and Israel have been almost completely isolated.
Obviously the United nations has opposed a series of American military operations.
And so I think Washington set out to render the UN irrelevant and has to a great extent succeeded. Though I must say, even so, I'm surprised, for example, by how completely absent Gutierrez, the present UN Secretary General, has been from the Ukraine conflict, where I think there was a possibility of the UN Continuing playing a very useful role, which it has not even tried to do.
[00:03:21] Speaker A: Yeah, I think, I mean, he did condemn, for what it was worth the attacks on Iran by the Trump Netanyahu coalition, but it didn't really matter much either way.
Interesting that India want a place on the Security Council, and there has been at last some kind of India China rapprochement that we witnessed in Delhi.
[00:03:47] Speaker B: Well, I mean, that is the only path for India to membership of the UN Security Council is if China would drop its objections. Because I don't think you would see the Americans, the British, the French or the Russians, of course, opposing it. It is China that is the big problem.
And there, yes, I mean, above all due to the US Israeli attack on Iran and its consequences for India and for Asia in general. We certainly do, as the BRICS summit demonstrated, see a considerable warming of relations between India and China.
But there is still this damnable issue of the contested frontier or frontiers in the Himalayas.
And if that can't be solved and it given present positions, it looks insoluble. There will always be a kind of ultimate barrier to full cooperation between China
[00:04:47] Speaker A: and India, and it's in the interest of the United States to stoke that up. I mean, there are no false flags, but, I mean, no evidence of any false flags. But certainly the people of the CIA would be thinking it would be nice if India and China were fighting there.
[00:05:03] Speaker B: Certainly. But then again, obviously one of the reasons why India is moving towards China is that under Trump, the US And Israel, Israel also having become a close partner of Narendra Modi's India, have shown total contempt for Indian interests. Indians have always stressed to me that secure energy exports from the Gulf and including from Iran are a vital interest of India because of India's dependence on these imports. There is no evidence that Trump and Netanyahu, when they launched this war, paid a second's notice. I mean, not just the interests of India, of course, the interests of anywhere else either.
But clearly for Delhi to have been treated with such ostentatious contempt by Washington and Tel Aviv is going to have consequences for Indian behavior and attitudes.
[00:06:00] Speaker A: Do you think the Trump administration even understand the importance to India of Chabah Port in Iran, which has been bombed?
They're repairing it, as far as I understand it. But you believe that that will further improve relations between India and, well, India and Iran, let alone India, Russia and China?
[00:06:23] Speaker B: Well, I think it's bound to.
I mean, I don't suppose Trump never heard of I.
The ignorance of Trump and some of his top people, Hegseth and company simply cannot be exaggerated.
And the rest of the American establishment either just salutes and falls into line or is so tied to Israeli interests that they don't give a damn. I mean, what this has demonstrated is that, and this by the way, is not just true of India, it's true of Europe, it's true of Britain compared to Israel, no other country is in the end of much serious concern to a large part of the Washington establishment. That is beginning to change because Israel has made itself so unpopular, especially it's beginning to change in the Democratic Party. But it hasn't changed at the top of the Republican Party yet. There are Republican dissidents like Tucker Carlson. Yes, but not the, not the Republican mainstream.
[00:07:31] Speaker A: Yeah, People can watch our interview. TUCKER Carlson on going underground. Negotiations, of course, are off the table.
As regards Ukraine, Russia appears to be saying so.
India importing Russian energy at record levels. The US Sanction threat, I mean, it doesn't matter what the United States threaten about sanctions. It doesn't matter at all.
Europe, of course, and Britain, I don't know how long they're, they can cope without Russian energy.
[00:08:01] Speaker B: Well, and of course Trump had to beg the Ukrainians to stop attacking Russian diesel production because diesel prices in the United States are surging.
And it's when of course, Americans start to suffer from an international crisis that the American government begins to pay notice. And clearly this could have a critical effect in losing the Republicans the midterm congressional elections in November.
An interesting question is whether the Europeans will go on or intensify seizures of Russia's so called shadow fleet.
They would of course be insane to do so with given what's happening in the Gulf and now the Red Sea and the threat.
[00:08:53] Speaker A: I mean, they are secretly importing Russian oil anyway, these Western European powers and Britain.
[00:08:58] Speaker B: Of course they are. And there's just been an exception for Greece to be allowed to transport Russian oil. I mean, there is utter hypocrisy in the European position and therefore I think that probably the seizures of the shadow fleet will remain symbolic.
I certainly hope so because I mean, there have been some pretty blood curdling Russian threats of how Russia will respond if these seizures continue.
[00:09:27] Speaker A: Yeah. Having said that, Russia didn't really respond to many of the provocations. Do you Think the Russian leadership think that that's what those Western European powers desire of them. Therefore, they're not going to give it to them. Because time and time again we haven't seen the Russian response that, well, many in Russia increasingly who oppose Putin want to happen.
[00:09:56] Speaker B: Yes, I mean, well, I mean, what is clear is that Putin is not aiming at and really does not want a direct clash with the West. I mean, these threats blustering by Russia have been intended to deter the west from, or NATO from intervening in Ukraine. They haven't been the prelude to a Russian attack on NATO.
But there is always the risk, of course, of some disastrous accident.
The Russians, I think, may have, assuming it wasn't a Ukrainian false flag operation, fired a missile at a train in Ukraine that wasn't carrying Western representatives so as to send a message, a warning, but missiles go astray.
And for example, I mean, the other way around, Russians have said to me, you remember what happened on the first day of the US attack on Iran?
It wasn't intentional, but a misdirected US missile hit a school and killed, what was it, 120 school children. Russians say if a Ukrainian missile, especially one guided by Western intelligence, goes astray and hits a school in Moscow or Petersburg, Putin would have no choice politically but to react directly against NATO. And then, of course, we are in a.
[00:11:35] Speaker A: Well, then we're in a game run by Ursula von der Leyen and Kaja Kallas. I understand you've said the EU should get rid of them.
[00:11:43] Speaker B: Oh, absolutely. No, I mean, Kallas in particular is a nightmare. And you see, the problem is if you go to European foreign ministries, as I have, they will say to you, oh, look, don't worry. Yes, we know Callas is mad. Callas hates the Russians, but she doesn't represent our foreign policy. She doesn't represent French or German or even British. Well, obviously Britain's not in the eu.
We are much more sensible.
All right, but how do you expect the Russians to know that when the foreign policy representative of the European Union is saying all these insane things?
Russians will pay attention and there's no
[00:12:27] Speaker A: prospect of it yet. So we can just expect, as we move into winter, even more warlike talk and, and lower gas reserves than in Europe as Europe declines in the new order.
[00:12:41] Speaker B: Well, yes, and of course, a terrible winter for ordinary Ukrainians, which is why Putin is willing to go on fighting until next year in the hope, obviously of gaining the whole of the Donbass, which he thinks he needs to be able to declare victory. But also just so that Ukraine is so weakened that it will make a deal on Russia's terms. Now, that said, you always have to remember that barring a complete Ukraine collapse, which doesn't look likely, whatever Russia gets out of this war will be far, far less than what Putin was aiming at when he launched the war. He was planning to turn the whole of Ukraine into a Russian client state. That simply isn't going to happen.
The second the plan B was to annex huge areas of the east and south of Ukraine, that hasn't happened and in my view, is very unlikely to happen.
So if Ukraine can come out of this war with 75% of its territory, minus areas that were never really part of Ukraine anyway, ethnically speaking, and the possibility of joining the European Union and with a strongly consolidated national spirit, then despite all the terrible suffering that Ukraine has experienced, that I think historically will still be seen as a Ukrainian victory.
[00:14:11] Speaker A: Professor Anatol Levin will continue after the break. Keep watching. New Order.
You're watching. New Order. Professor Anatol Levanu is saying that Ukraine could forge some kind of victory despite all the odds in any settlement. But isn't the point that Putin didn't really want all of the land of Ukraine? He wanted and realized that there has to be a new order. The title of this very show and the entire Global South, Global east has changed after 2022. And that's really the prize, the end of US hegemony.
[00:15:02] Speaker B: Well, Russia cannot end US hegemony on its own. It's not remotely strong.
[00:15:08] Speaker A: It doesn't need to.
[00:15:10] Speaker B: Well, no, I mean, well, but that's it.
As has often been said about the Chinese, and the Chinese say themselves in private, we don't need to do anything. Trump is doing a wonderful job of destroying America's global position without us having to do anything, which is why, you know, the one reason why the Chinese are pursuing such a very cautious and prudent policy.
But
[00:15:41] Speaker A: I mean, cautious and prudent. I understand you were in China earlier this year. I mean, is it your understanding China are supplying weapons to Iran at the moment?
[00:15:53] Speaker B: They are supplying certain kinds of technology, although obviously in public, they deny it, but they are not supplying large quantities of actual weapons. No, as far as I can see. And as one Chinese interlocutor said to me, we're not allies of Iran, despite what many Americans say. And America should be very grateful that we're not, because if we were allies of Iran, a large part of the American Navy would be at the bottom of the Indian Ocean by now, just as if we were Allies of Russia. Russia would have won the war in Ukraine because real Chinese military supplies, look, I mean, America has exhausted its stocks of air defense systems just by fighting the Iranians. Imagine if the Chinese came in as well with really large scale supplies.
The American position would be impossible. Now, of course, the Chinese really don't want to do that because they understand the terrible risks involved.
And I think also. Well, certainly if you read the Chinese media, they believe that history is on their side, time is on their side. The west is declining pretty steeply now and it makes much more sense.
[00:17:09] Speaker A: Yeah, but you're saying it's caution. You're saying it's caution. And of course, one could equally say the same about India, that it's playing a cautious game while being in the quad, but at the same time backing Chaba airport in Iran and continuing to support the war against NATO through Ukraine by buying Russian oil. But China's bond holdings of U.S. treasuries, which is the big news all around the world, as NATO nation economies arguably collapse, it is shocking how they have declined the way China has.
Not buying US debt anymore. And obviously it has to be very careful unwinding it, but it really is increasingly averting itself from the dollar system.
[00:17:58] Speaker B: Well, after what happened to Russian holdings in the West, a country which thinks it might get into a deep crisis with America would be insane to keep most of its foreign holdings in dollars that could be seized by America, obviously, I mean, not just China. Other countries also are gradually drawing it down. Not too fast, of course, because to really draw them down quickly would risk collapsing first the US economy and then the world economy as a whole. But the general trend is very clear.
[00:18:32] Speaker A: So in a sense that may well be the kill switch, some might say. I mean, in the past few days, Brazil's top diplomat, Celso Almarim, an ally of Lula, who I have spoken to in the past. Lula has been very critical obviously of US policy, but has to be equally cautious.
Been talking with Wang Yi this week. There was some Brazil, China, Friends for Peace, Ukraine initiative.
Clear that China's benefited from the proxy war in Russia through Ukraine in many ways.
Well, discounted Russian oil, of course,
[00:19:11] Speaker B: yes, to a degree. And Russia has become more dependent on China. But then of course, on the other hand, well, the Chinese did not expect the Iran war on top of that.
But in the first place, of course, China is still dependent on global energy imports and anything that seriously disrupts that is a threat to China.
[00:19:33] Speaker A: Although around the time you were in China, professor, was when they were increasing Stocks massively, as if in preparation, they seemed remarkably insulated.
I don't know what you were telling them. I don't know what you were telling them, Professor.
[00:19:48] Speaker B: Yeah, but now you see, according to the latest news, the Chinese stocks are beginning to run out and that is bad news not just for China but really for all the Asian economies because it has been the Chinese release of these reserves which to a great extent has compensated the whole of Asia for the loss of oil from the Persian Gulf. If China, if Chinese reserves run out completely, then the economic consequences could be dire. And of course an interesting question to which I don't have the answer is at that point will China try to become much more directly involved in the Middle east and basically tell the Americans stop this war or else what? Or else would be, I don't know. But I wonder just how long China can afford, or India for that matter, can afford for this war to go on.
[00:20:47] Speaker A: So if one was giving a scorecard, let alone the war on Iran, have BRICS powers, Shanghai Cooperation Organization powers, successfully used the war in Europe as best they could to destroy Washington consensus power? Or could they have done a bit more faster?
I mean hopefully the war in Europe may be coming to an end in the next 12 months. Have they done as best as they could or could they have done better as regards de dollarization trade ties, throwing the IMF and World bank out and as such?
[00:21:25] Speaker B: Well, I don't think, I mean a lot of countries like India, but even Brazil or I think even China to a degree do not want to destroy America's power, certainly not quickly, certainly not
[00:21:42] Speaker A: avowedly, the consequent, certainly not avowedly as was made clear.
[00:21:46] Speaker B: But I think I was at the BRICS Academic Council last year and there was a clear division there between Russia, China and South Africa on the one hand much more anti American and India and Brazil on the other, much more, well, India much less anti American and Brazil sort of trying to say how right everybody was and maintain a, a middle position.
[00:22:15] Speaker A: In fairness, Tallulah, he had been in prison.
[00:22:18] Speaker B: Yes, Now India has shifted undoubtedly as a result of the Iran war, but I would still describe Indian policy as more like a phrase that you very often hear from the former Soviet republics in Central Asia which is a multi vector policy.
In other words, we are not going to, well, they mean we are not going to simply go with Russia but equally we are not going to commit ourselves to the United States.
We want to keep open relations with everybody and I think for the moment that is what most of the Global south wishes to do.
[00:22:59] Speaker A: Yeah, the problem is a lot of people are going to think that's very naive because Washington wants a choice.
It doesn't give nations that choice.
[00:23:08] Speaker B: Oh, absolutely. But the question now is, is Washington? In the past Washington could simply have thumped the table and ordered them to submit. But is Washington powerful enough to do that anymore? I don't think so.
Obviously China is now a much bigger economic player outside the financial area in Asia than the United States is.
So America's power to coerce people is just much less. But on the other hand, I think the Indians are still wary that if they really push both to weaken the US and to institutionalize brics at the moment, China is still so much more powerful that this will be a Chinese dominated brics, possibly a Chinese dominated world. That is something that the Indians still worry about. That is why, as they have told me, they are not going to commit themselves completely. Certainly not to the US but not to an anti US position either.
[00:24:07] Speaker A: The ghosts of divide and rule, imperial divide and rule, kind of alive when it comes to destroying Washington consensus forever. I just got to ask about Western Europe. One last question. I mean, how long do you think Britain and France are going to be on the United Nations Security Council, let alone whether India will be on it?
Can they remain on the UN Security Council for much longer?
[00:24:31] Speaker B: Well, I think they can remain on the UN Security Council forever.
The question is whether the UN itself and the Security Council will mean anything 50 years from now, let alone 100. I mean those remember the Mogul Emperor long, long after he had become basically an old age pensioner of the British, was still issuing Ferman's orders, appointing kings and governors across India. Total nonsense, of course, but that nobody wanted to tell the poor fellow that it was all over. So you know, yes, they can still sit there, but it won't mean anything.
[00:25:14] Speaker A: Professor Anatol Levin, thank you.
Questions from you, the viewers through social media, through Zahra Khan. Now, Professor Anatol Levin not going to get a job as Antonio Guterres's speechwriter anytime soon after what he said about the un.
[00:25:32] Speaker C: But more importantly, the questions from our audience on X Old Pretender has asked, are the US and European markets broke and maxed out on debt?
[00:25:39] Speaker A: We've been talking for years about US debt and it didn't really matter because everyone recycled the dollar. That's the way the dollar system worked. 40 trillion US debt to debt to GDP ratio of 125%. It does matter now. That's why Trump is going. We need AI I don't care whether AI means Armageddon and AI is used by Yemen to attack Saudi Arabia. We need AI because otherwise the whole of the United States is, is going to self combust. If you look at Europe, Greece, Italy, France, Spain, all debt ratios that are higher than what they produce. So in other words, they are essentially bankrupt. It hasn't mattered before, but after 2022 in Ukraine, it does matter because it's Brics and the new order. The new order will not allow countries to run debts like this.
[00:26:24] Speaker C: Interesting that you say 2022 because Tomka has asked what happens if the sanctions become increasingly frequently sanctions.
[00:26:31] Speaker A: I presume Tonka means US Sanctions, NATO nation sanctions. It doesn't matter to India, clearly. India says we don't care about sanctions on Russian energy. As we've said on this program before, 38 million have been killed in 152 countries around the world by American sanctions between 1971 and 2021, according to the Lancet. I think the global south now remembers the slaughter caused by United States sanctions, NATO nation sanctions, they don't care anymore and people can use crypto anyway to evade sanctions, although of course we're not advising it.
[00:27:05] Speaker C: And finally, Paul Champagne says if Trump is leaving NATO but American troops aren't leaving Europe, does that make the American occupation official?
[00:27:12] Speaker A: You know, Paul Champagne has a point there. It's difficult to remember how many troops are in Western Europe. Thousands and thousands of troops just recently in RAF Lakenheath in Suffolk. In Britain, the United states just transferred 20B61 12 tactical nuclear weapons.
Zero response from Russia.
Why does Europe allow all those US occupying powers? Because Europe has never since 1945 been independent. Its arts institutions, its universities, its schools, its entire societies of Western Europe have been vassals that have been condemned to be part of the military industrial complex.
[00:27:52] Speaker C: Thank you for those answers, Afshin. We'll be back with more next week.
[00:27:55] Speaker A: Thanks, Sara. And follow us on X ewordertv to ask your questions. We'll be back with another look at the people, countries and ideas shaping what comes next for India and its partners. See you next Sunday.
[00:28:05] Speaker B: It.
