Episode Transcript
[00:00:00] Speaker A: I'm Ash Srinratantian. You're watching New Order. We're broadcasting around the world, including to nearly 1 1/2 billion on RT India. New order explores how India and its allies are helping redefine the geopolitical landscape of the 21st century.
Away from Trump's spectacular defeat against Iran, China is imminently set to send its Foreign Minister Wang Yi to India for the BRICS National Security Advisory rises meetings, a clear sign of BRICS strength and realignment. Ahead of September's BRICS summit in Delhi. India's Prime Minister Modi has just been in heavy out the G7amidst leaders of collapsing US vassal states. He met a defeated Trump face to face for the first time in 16 months and said that global maritime routes must be protected, a pointed reference to Indian seafarers killed off the coast of Oman last week as part of the Epstein War on Iran. Trump, for his part, called Modi the most beautiful looking man and announced he will visit India sometime in the future and quietly. With no fanfare and no press conference, the Pentagon dropped the word Indo from Indo Pacific Command, reverting to the Pacific Command name it carried before 2018, when the change was described as a symbolic nod to India's growing importance to American strategy. The Indian Ocean didn't shrink. India's navy didn't get smaller. What change is a nameplate on a building in Hawaii? And that tells you perhaps considerably more about the turbulence inside American strategic thinking than it does about India's place in the world. At the end of the show, after a week that saw that pause in Israeli U.S. wars in West Asia will be joined by New Order Zahra Khan, to answer questions from you, the viewers. But now let's turn to India's former foreign secretary, Kanwal Simil, one of India's most distinguished diplomatic voices. He's a former ambassador to Russia, France, Egypt and Turkey. And he spent decades at the forefront of Indian diplomacy, helping shape the country's engagement with the major global powers during periods of profound geopolitical change. Today, he joins me from London. Ambassador, thank you for joining us on New Order, a week of leaks ahead of Friday's scheduled U. S. Iran peace agreement that's so important for India's supply lines. But as I said in the introduction there, after the killing of Indian merchant seamen, the US Drops Indo from Indo Pacific, reverting to US Pacific Command. What can we draw from that?
[00:02:29] Speaker B: I think the timing is very odd. Just before Prime Minister Modi was going to meet Trump after 16 months, as you said, they changed the name. But then, you know, there's a background to this, because when Peter Hegseth went for the Shangri La dialogue and outlined the defense vision of United States, he dwelt a lot on ASEAN and Korea and Philippines and Japan and everything else. And then he mentioned in passing India and in their national security review also, India was not really mentioned prominently at all. And neither was the Quad, apart from one single mention of the Quad. So the signs were already there that there was a review of thinking in the United States with regard to China and with regard to how much importance they should now give to deterring China in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Of course, this has a problem also for Japan and Australia, which was very, very much part of this four nation configuration. You know, the Biden administration and Trump in his first term, they had linked the security of the Indian Ocean to the security of the Pacific Ocean.
And who was the threat to the security? Clearly, from their perspective, it was China. And now they are dealing, at least ostensibly by renaming the Pacific Command, dealing the security of the Indian Ocean from the Pacific Ocean. They will be dealt with separ. In a sense. Now, China has always been opposed openly and so has Russia to Quad and the concept of the Indo Pacific. So they'll be quite happy and they will construe it in the manner in which they want to interpret it as a kind of a sign of Trump reaching out to China. Remember, in his meeting with Modi, he said, well, there is the G7 meeting, there's going to be a G20 meeting, and there's going to be the G2 meeting.
And he said, you know what that G2 means. So clearly he has in mind Xi Jinping's visit to the United States in September this year. So I think we can see that from the perspective of what signals he wants to send to China. But it doesn't trouble us, frankly.
There are two things in this. One is that there is no other navy in the Indian Ocean which can replace the range, power and capacity of the Indian Navy. Only the US Navy is present, but it's not present there permanently.
It has a basin base in Diego Garcia, but that's about it. Because the only credible navy in the Indian Ocean is that of India.
The United States has a powerful navy, but it has only one base in Diego Garcia.
But otherwise it cannot operate in the Indian Ocean without having the capacity to actually have bases or have regular arrangements for port calls and everything else. So in any future, you know, confrontation of any kind in this region, and if they want to deal with the lines of communication, trade and energy through the Indian Ocean.
The Indian Navy will be indispensable as a partner.
[00:05:50] Speaker A: Yeah, neither Diego Garcia if the British give the Chagos islanders their island back.
[00:05:57] Speaker B: But in my view, in a sense, this is helpful to us because we don't want to get caught in any adventure that United States and Trump may launch against China over the Taiwan issue. We don't want to get involved in that. Now, if we were to then accept that the security of the Indian and Pacific oceans are linked and the US Pacific Command is the Indo Pacific Command, then there is a degree of pressure of India to stand up and be useful in that context.
Now, as the French president said some time ago that we don't want to be part of any irrational decisions that the United States takes visa with China.
That applies to us even more because we have a continuous border with China.
We have troops stationed on Himalayan Heights facing each other, up to 50,000 on each side.
We don't want to take the risk of any conflict with China because the conflict in the Himalayas will not be a conflict on the sea.
We'll have to deal with that entirely on our own, which we want to and which we are determined to, therefore, on sea routes.
[00:07:05] Speaker A: I mean, so anyway, it might be a good. It might be a good outcome, even if people of the Pentagon don't realize it. But we've got to remember this is all in the context also of Trump calling Pakistan's Field Marshal Asim Munir fantastic. Pakistan, of course, being the intermediary supposedly for the Iran deal.
And that Trump killed effectively three Indian sailors on the Chief NJR Patnala Suresh Kadet, Aditya Sharma, Sivanandan Charisya. I mean, these three sailors were killed. The Seafarers Union of India saying sending condolences is not enough. Manoj Yadav of the Seafarers Union general secretary, the US should pay $5 million to each family. Haven't really heard much about compensation.
[00:07:53] Speaker B: No, this issue has not been raised and there have been no condolences on the American side, which I think is very poor diplomacy on their part. In fact, when our foreign minister raised this issue with Rubio, Rubio's response was very aggressive, very harsh, very peremptory that these ships have to obey the orders of the US Navy and any infraction of the blockade will not be tolerated. Now, what surprised me is that two days later, United States lifts up the blockade.
So did Rubio know that this was going to happen? Obviously he did. And if he did, why did he adopt such a harsh tone. He could have stated his position as strongly as he wanted, but he should have also had the diplomatic finesse of saying that we are. Nevertheless, we regret that in the process, Indian nationals were killed. It was not our intention, but these things happened in a conflict situation. Something of that sort could have been said if there was wise diplomacy on their part. But there is such arrogance and a belief that they can do what they want and they're not answerable to anybody.
[00:09:05] Speaker A: Although certainly Trump was much more diplomatic than Rubio, who some see as an Israeli stooge.
[00:09:11] Speaker B: The Prime Minister raised this. He made a statement in the G7 where Trump was present, and then in his bilateral conversation with Trump, he raised this issue.
In fact, I applaud him for raising this issue in a pretty strong manner and saying that we have lacks of Indian sailors who are flying commercial, who are manning commercial ships worldwide, and the security has to be protected this and that. And Trump was very evasive. He said, yes, yes, but these things happen. You know, these are the sort of things that happen, and it's sort of this and that. So he evaded addressing the issue. To my mind, he missed an opportunity. He could again have said that, you know, it is a matter of regret that your nationals were killed, but this was a fraud situation and these things can happen. Even if he had said that, that would have closed the matter. He didn't say that.
They seem to suggest that it was all right. I mean, these are risks these fellows have to take.
What is the reason why us should fire Hellfire missiles at an unarmed commercial ship where the Australians are not posing any military threat to the United States?
[00:10:18] Speaker A: Would they have done it if it wasn't an Indian ship? Would they have done it to a European vessel? There were so many. I mean, this studio is not far from the region we're talking about. I mean, that was off the coast of Oman. I mean, would they have. I mean, how do these tensions play in India's membership of the Quad? This. This alignment supposedly with the U.S. empire?
[00:10:44] Speaker B: Well, I think Quad is now dying a slow death.
You know, they have not had been able to hold the summit in order to sort of keep the dying cops alive a little bit.
Rubio came to Delhi for the Quad foreign ministers meeting.
But if you look at the outcome and the agenda, it was very.
It was very tame. There was nothing really that came out. And the possibility of holding a summit is not there on the horizon. And after renaming the U.S. pacific Command and other signals that have come from their strategic reviews and Defense reviews and general statements with Peter Hex has made it is clear that they are not attaching that much importance to court.
In a sense, some Indians might be a bit relieved that they were getting into a body where the Americans now wanted to emphasize the security aspect of it much more, much more than India would prefer. Because we have right from the start, while being a member of the Quad, always try to emphasize other dimensions of the call.
Broadening the agenda to critical and raw materials and technologies, to climate change, to hadr, to illegal shipping, human smuggling and stuff like that, so as to give a more lasting agenda to this four power cooperation rather than limiting it only to the security part.
And I think the others have gone along with this, Australia and Japan in particular. The Americans, at least their commentators, have always said that India is sort of a, you know, not that serious a member of the Quad.
He doesn't want to take any security obligations that they want.
[00:12:46] Speaker A: There was a Quad like implication, wasn't there, when the Americans said.
There were reports that the Americans had used Indian ports for attacking Iran, which is quickly denied by the External Affairs Minister.
[00:12:59] Speaker B: That's not true because we've had these foundational agreements, the LEMOA and stuff like that, which we have also with Japan and with Australia and with Russia and with one or two other countries, we have these arrangements where they can. When we have military exercises, then instead of doing accounts, sitting together and seeing how much has been spent here in terms of fuel supplies and stuff like that, you have a mutual arrangement where you can, up to a certain number, you know, use the port facilities and supplies and everything else and do that accounting on a comprehensive basis. So this is the thought behind it. It is not meant to be, and mind you, very important that it does not mean free access to Indian ports. Every single request for accessing Indian port has to be cleared politically by the Indian government.
So there's no question of India allowing United States to use our ports to attack any West Asian country or Iran or what have you.
[00:14:06] Speaker A: Ambassador Sybil, I'll stop you there. We'll continue after the break. Keep watching. New order.
You're watching. New order. Ambassador Sybil, we were talking about, I don't know, interoperability in the Quad. The fact the Quad's influence and perhaps demise is imminent. But as well as killing three seafarers, Indian seafarers off the coast of Oman, Netanyahu, Trump airstrikes targeted railways used in the north south transport corridor and Moscow, Tehran, Baku, all doubling down.
How do you think Mumbai sees the north south transport Corridor, because Mumbai is where it flows from, and it's seen as such an important Eurasian development. And some saw the Trump attack, Netanyahu attack, as an attempt to destroy that.
[00:15:10] Speaker B: Well, you know, I was myself involved in this when I was in office.
In fact, I visited Astrakhan when I was ambassador in Moscow because it's the other end of the international north south trade corridor.
And, you know, there were some issues with regard to transport through the Caspian Sea and movement of containers. And containers, when they go filled with goods, then they have to come back filled with goods, too, which means this has to be very flourishing trade on both sides. Of course, the time factor is important. It cut the time factor considerably in terms of exports of goods from India to Russia. And it was a third, of course, Southeast Asia, too, not only India, in terms of.
[00:15:51] Speaker A: You think that's why it was targeted? I should say we're having a few connection issues at the corridor between Dubai and London here. But then, you know, maybe. But there's one important as powerful. You think it was deliberately targeted precisely
[00:16:04] Speaker B: for that, you know, but, you know, if it was very flourishing corridor, then I would say, yes, that may have been the intention. But the thing is that because Iran has been under sanctions and the Iranians have not been able to devise custom procedures and everything else on the ground which would allow for a very smooth translate of goods from India and elsewhere through their territory onto Russia. So there have been some technical problems, partly because of the manner in which Iran deals with these things and their administrative structures, as well as, of course, the sanctions part. So it's not as if by doing this they were cutting off any lifeline as such.
[00:16:51] Speaker A: Well, it was at preparatory stages. I mean, perhaps the deal, however, and the ending of sanctions will mean extra impetus for it.
[00:17:00] Speaker B: Yes, definitely. As also for Chabahar Port once the sanctions are lifted.
And then, of course, if India begins to buy Iranian oil, don't forget that until America forced us to stop buying oil from Iran, Iran was the second largest supplier of oil to India, and at times even the largest.
So that oil can become available to India, that will reinforce our ties with Iran, and then that will have a very positive impact on the rest of the relationship in terms of also developing and promoting these kind of corridors through Iran. So to that extent, yes, the prospects are good.
And if Israel attacked the railway lines, I think it was not so much as to disrupt the communication with Russia. It's just to destroy as much as possible the infrastructure.
[00:17:52] Speaker A: Yeah, Iran says it's been rebuilt already. I should Say there's still a few connection issues, but we can hear you loud and clear. Of course. Now there is a case that some believe that Trump will now pivot towards the war in Europe again, the proxy war in Russia, in which case along comes the tariff sanctions threat on India for importing Russian energy even whilst do you think MODI could make more of a case about the fact that all these European nations are basically importing the Russian energy from India and China and Turkey after they are received from Russia? What do you think about the reaction and has been the reaction of Russia, sorry, the reaction of India to the constant threats and off the record briefings saying India is going to have to face trouble because it's supporting the Russian war machine.
[00:18:46] Speaker B: A couple of things. Before 2022, India was not importing Russian oil because the economics were not favorable. And since we have huge sources of oil and gas supplies next to us in the Gulf countries, it didn't make much sense to have that kind of a relationship with Russia.
But after the Ukraine war and the discounted oil of Russia and Russia gave excellent discounts, suddenly the India Russia oil ties began to flourish to the extent that Russia became the biggest supplier of oil to India.
Now Russia wants to sustain that relationship, we want to sustain that relationship.
United States wants to interfere in that relationship. But if they realize that if they stop the Russian oil from entering the global market, then the oil prices globally will spike and it will hurt the American consumer. Therefore, they have been giving waivers month after month to allow India to access Russian oil. Actually, it is humiliating for India to be told that we will allow you to buy oil from Russia because these are commercial decisions of a sovereign nature. We should have the capacity to buy oil from Russia. If the Russian price is attractive, why should we have to wait for US permission? But the point is, our private sector, which has great interest in economic interest in the United States, you know, firms like Reliance, they don't want their business to be hitched, they want to have access to the American finance.
[00:20:31] Speaker A: Nevertheless, India was pretty dead first in saying, so what if you want to do even secondary?
[00:20:37] Speaker B: India was very courageous because they said very clearly that we are not going to instruct our company this way or that way. We will let them take decisions based on commercial basis, on commercial terms. And if Russian oil is cheap, they'll buy Russian oil. And they've continued to buy Russian oil, although in between the numbers dropped. But they have gone up again now, as you said.
Now that if the United States decides that they have talked the ante With Russia and the G7 statement on Ukraine, to my mind, is very, very aggressive and should cause concern to the global South.
Now, if Trump now veers towards more pressure on Russia and purchase of Russian oil, then India will have to take some hard decisions.
Putin is sending some very clear messages. In fact, he said more than once that India is a very independent country, doesn't submit itself to pressure. Modi is not the person who's going to back down.
So I interpret it in two ways. One, of course he's seen that Modi does resist pressure. On the other hand, he's also conveying a message, please stand up to this pressure.
So we will have to take some hard decisions. I don't think the Indian public opinion would allow India not to buy Russian oil, but some diminution of the supplies can occur. In the meantime, we're trying to satisfy the United States by buying more oil from them. In fact, we bought several billion dollars of oil from the United States as a kind of a sop.
[00:22:15] Speaker A: Well, I mean, away from BRICS and the BRICS summit in September and all of that. Since you're speaking to me from London, how is the old colonial ruler Britain looking and these European countries, because I understand that you saw the G7 in Evia.
Has there were mischaracterizations, as if Modi, Lula, Sisi were just one block.
There's something different between those three leaders being Inevia and the vassal states of Western Europe.
[00:22:50] Speaker B: Well, you know the G7 wants to continue to be relevant.
You know that in between, the G20 became the real forum of cooperation between the G7 countries and the rising economies of the Global south so that they could work together to stabilize the global economy.
Now the United States has wrecked the G20. In fact, they're not inviting South Africa to the G20 summit in the United States.
So G7 now wants to come back on its own. But then in order to have credibility, they can't ignore the important countries of the Global South.
And therefore they do invite as a reach out to countries like Brazil, India or whoever else, or Egypt or what have you, they want to co opt these countries, not really cooperate with them, but co opt them as part of their grip over the traditional grip over the global economy.
[00:23:53] Speaker A: We're running out of time. Did it work? Did they co opt Modi, Lula and Sisi?
[00:23:58] Speaker B: No, no, no, no, no, no. I think we find it useful that we have a platform. As Prime Minister said, I expressed very clearly what the concerns of the Global south are. We want to be the voice of the global South. We want to steer them towards the G20 agenda rather than focusing on their own advanced economies agenda. And that serves a useful purpose. And of course we have very good relations with Europe.
We have negotiated an fta, individual European countries. We have some very good ties on the technology side, on the defense side. So it helps us to be part of this. With Canada, our relations are improving vastly, very rapidly. So it serves our purpose to be part of the G7, but not in terms of compromising our basic interest as a developing economy, as a voice of the global south, and to steer the G7 agenda towards a more positive.
In a more positive direction that takes into account not only their interest, but the interest of the entire global community.
[00:24:57] Speaker A: Ambassador Kanra Seville, thank you.
[00:25:00] Speaker B: My pleasure.
[00:25:07] Speaker A: And now I'm joined by Zahra Khan with some of your questions.
[00:25:11] Speaker C: Zahra, before we get to the questions, a very happy international Yoga Day to you.
[00:25:15] Speaker A: I'll be celebrating in my own way. Let's hear the viewers questions.
[00:25:18] Speaker C: And first off, Alison Kent has asked, I think a very important question. Let's say India gets a UNSCC tomorrow. What's the first thing that it does?
[00:25:26] Speaker A: I should have asked Ambassador Sibyl that. Okay, first of all, end the UN Security Council veto if India gets a place on the Security Council so that we can't just have again the United States vetoing everything. And given what the ambassador, the former Foreign Secretary of India, was just saying about threats to India, how about an investigation into sanctions? Given that they're gonna threaten India with sanctions because it's importing Russian energy and why 38 million people were killed by sanctions between 1970 and 2021. That would be a good UN commission.
[00:25:54] Speaker C: I mean sanctions. Brings me to the next question SOF has asked. The west buys more Russian oil than India does, but why does only India get the lectures?
[00:26:03] Speaker A: Is it work of a new order? I was kind of intimating that in the interview with the former Foreign Secretary of India. Yeah. Britain, $2.2 billion of Russian oil imports. Germany, 10% of its LNG from Russia via Dunkirk. All these shadow fleets that are coming from Belgium. Belgium is the home of the eu. They're the ones illegally importing Russian energy. It's all a lie, of course. And of course it's Kiev that charges money so that Russia can send energy through it, through pipelines. So the dictator Zelenskyy of the neo Nazi Kiev regime is taking money from Russia. It's a bit of a lie, isn't it? So why are they threatening India over tariffs and sanctions because it is chosen, as the foreign foreign Secretary said, as a sovereign country to import energy from where it wants to.
[00:26:57] Speaker C: And finally, Nicholas Reid has asked who is most likely to succeed Saif Gaddafi as the leader of the Gaddafi loyalists in Libya.
[00:27:03] Speaker A: People have forgotten about the NATO war in Libya and the destruction of Africa's richest per capita country quickly, Asia Gaddafi, Muhammad Gaddafi. They live in Oman. I don't think it probably will be them.
Interestingly for Haftar supporters, he's a former CIA agent but linked now to Russia and the uae. Saddam Haftar, the son of Khalifa Haftar, was in Moscow last month to meet the Russian defense Minister Andrei Belousov. So could we see a successor? I'm not sure they're going to be as arguably charismatic as Saif Gaddafi. It'll be up to someone to introduce a new African common currency, perhaps with brics and perhaps with the new order.
[00:27:46] Speaker C: Well, I'll see you same place, same time next week with more questions, few at Yoga.
[00:27:50] Speaker A: Zara Khan, thank you. And that's it for me. Afshan Ratanshi, remember to follow us on social media. And here's a question for you. India chairs BRICS and was just out the G7. Do you think India can keep balancing both worlds or will it be forced to pick a side by 2030? Send us your answer on X@NeworderTV. Join us next Sunday as we continue to track shifting global power and where India sits in this new order.
